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Abstract: Under the assumption of perfect competition, it is diﬃcult to avoid the
conclusion that abandoned properties and long undeveloped neighborhoods remain
that way because they are unproﬁtable. In contrast, this paper introduces a model
in which ﬁrms systematically overlook neighborhoods with little commercial activity
because of a positive informational externality motivating later movers to condition
choice of location on earlier movers’ locations. When this occurs, ﬁrms sometimes
ﬁnd it proﬁtable to imitate early movers’ locations even though privately acquired
information suggests locating elsewhere. The model facilitates normative analysis
of imitation in location choice by explicitly quantifying losses in aggregate eﬃciency
following a shift from centralized to decentralized regimes. The model provides a tool
for investigating the hypothesis of ineﬃcient lock-in as it relates to neighborhoods
in U.S. urban centers that remain underutilized despite the presence of proﬁtable
business prospects.
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Imitation is natural to man from childhood, one of his advantages over the lower
animals being this, that he is the most imitative creature in the world, and learns at
ﬁrst by imitation. —Aristotle (Poetics, Chapter IV)
1 Introduction
This paper presents a model of information acquisition and location choice among
proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms. In contrast to theories based on the assumption of ﬁrst-
mover advantage, the model focuses on the beneﬁt that second movers enjoy by
conditioning on ﬁrst movers’ locations. Such opportunities for utilizing information
implicit in the locations of other ﬁrms give rise to the possibility of imitation, quan-
tiﬁed as the extent to which second movers substitute away from costly acquisition
of private information into costless observation of ﬁrst movers.
One motivation for modeling imitation in location choice is to investigate the pos-
sibility of behavioral barriers to redevelopment in older, low-income neighborhoods
within central cities. Brueckner and Rosenthal (2005) identify age of housing stock
as a key predictor of future changes in neighborhood income, which naturally leads
to comparisons of factors that inﬂuence new development in suburbs versus redevel-
opment within central cities. Observing low-income neighborhoods in central cities
with very little retail activity, the standard neoclassical model suggests that, despite
advantages such as lower rents and fewer competitors, these areas are passed over for
good reason—because ﬁrms cannot proﬁtably operate stores there. In contrast, the
hypothesis considered here is that small ﬁrms use an imitation heuristic for choosing
locations, which succeeds at maximizing proﬁts in environments with abundant in-
formation such as thriving big-box developments in the suburbs, but fails to exploit
genuinely proﬁtable opportunities in urban environments with little or no available in-
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formation concerning revenues and costs. In these low-information environments with
limited retail activity, stigmatizing perceptions may result in lock-in, because lack of
new entrants into these neighborhoods cuts oﬀ the production of new information
about the proﬁtability of current business activity.
One of the models results is to reveal conditions under which imitation in lo-
cation choice is consistent with individual proﬁt maximization. In so doing, the
model provides a benchmark for addressing the normative question of how imitation
aﬀects aggregate eﬃciency. Incentives that rationalize imitation from the point of
view of individual ﬁrms can, however, lead to socially ineﬃcient neglect of proﬁtable
locations—for example, when ﬁrms do not consider moving into a no-retail neighbor-
hood simply because no other ﬁrms are observed there, and not because expected
proﬁts were estimated and deemed too low.
For parameterizations with low costs of private information, the models ﬁrst movers
acquire large quantities of private information, and imitation by second movers is con-
sistent with social eﬃciency (i.e., maximization of aggregate proﬁt by a centrally coor-
dinated program designed to eﬃciently exploit the positive informational externality
ﬂowing from ﬁrst to second movers). In this case, the ﬁrst mover is well informed
about where to ﬁnd good locations and, consequently, centralized and decentralized
regimes diﬀer very little. As information becomes more expensive, however, imita-
tion becomes increasingly inconsistent with aggregate eﬃciency, because ﬁrst movers
acquire small quantities of private information and the aggregate beneﬁts of pooling
additional private signals grow larger. But because ﬁrms and centralized planners
both demand very little information when information is very expensive, the gap in
aggregate proﬁts between decentralized and centralized regimes shrinks and ineﬃ-
ciency tends toward zero at the other extreme of the cost-of-information spectrum.
Thus, eﬃciency losses are largest in the intermediate range of the cost of private
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information and minimal at the extremes.
Interest in theoretical mechanisms that lead to socially ineﬃcient spatial lock-in
among retailers draws, in part, on recent evidence that stores such as Starbucks and
Home Depot have earned proﬁts far in excess of what their own demand forecast
models predicted by investing in long overlooked, low-income neighborhoods previ-
ously regarded as unproﬁtable (Weissbourd, 1999; Helling and Sawicki, 2003; Sabety
and Carlson, 2003). For example, Vice President of Starbuck’s Store Development
Cydnie Horwat writes: “Our Urban Coﬀee Opportunities joint venture has essentially
shown that Starbucks can penetrate demographically diverse neighborhoods in un-
derserved communities, such as our store in Harlem, which is not something that we
had previously looked at” (Francica, 2000).
This raises questions. How could Starbucks have overlooked a proﬁtable oppor-
tunity for so long, and why did it require a new, joint initiative to discover that the
coﬀee giant could operate proﬁtably in ethnically mixed, low income neighborhoods?
Are neighborhoods in central cities that retailers avoid really less proﬁtable, or do
interdependencies among ﬁrms’ location decisions lead to ineﬃcient lock-in at a sta-
tus quo biased against such neighborhoods simply because ﬁrms have decided against
them in the past? And ﬁnally, should we be surprised that sophisticated ﬁrms, even
those that conduct extensive market research, base location decisions primarily on ob-
served choices of other ﬁrms instead of independently weighing the costs and beneﬁts
associated with each of many candidates drawn from a large consideration set?
The model presented below suggests that we should not be surprised to ﬁnd im-
itation heuristics in widespread use among business decision makers responsible for
choosing locations because, in many environments, imitation is consistent with proﬁt
maximization. The model also demonstrates and provides a means of quantifying the
social cost of imitation in location choice. The behavioral mechanism of imitation as
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a cause for spatial concentration suggests one plausible explanation for why neighbor-
hoods that should be capable of sustaining proﬁtable retail activity—and would do so,
if ﬁrms conducted independent calculations of expected proﬁt—sometimes wind up in
a state of abandonment, failing over a sustained period of time to attract mainstream
commercial activity.
It is unclear how far models of crime as a factor in residential location (Helsley
and Strange, 1999; Verdier, T., and Zenou, 2004; Helsley and Strange, 2005) ex-
tend to the case of retail location choice. Yet beliefs about crime appear to play
a large role in conditioning ﬁrms’ decisions about entering ghettos and other stig-
matized neighborhoods (Bray, 2007; Weissbourd, 1999). Interviews with business
decision makers responsible for location choice (Berg, 2007) conﬁrm that many ﬁrms
cite crime as a reason for not considering stigmatized neighborhoods, although those
ﬁrms rarely, if ever, conduct or commission quantitative beneﬁt-cost assessments to
justify such omissions from their consideration sets. Instead, the decision processes
of most ﬁrms’ location decisions appear to rely heavily on imitation heuristics and
threshold rules (i.e., satisﬁcing) that quickly narrow down the consideration set to a
handful of candidates, in line with the ideas of Simon (1954, 1955), Cyert and March
(1963), and March (1988). Indeed, the biology literature shows imitation to be an
adaptive strategy for animals in a number of environments (Noble, Todd and Tuci,
2001; Hutchinson, 2005), just as the social science literature identiﬁes environments
where imitation leads to success (Gigerenzer and Selten, 2002; Bosch-Domnech and
Vriend, 2003) Concerning the normative focus of this paper, it is useful to recall that
spatial agglomeration, or clustering, in the classic Hotelling (1929) model is wasteful,
as ﬁrms locate in the center to split the market rather than at locations minimizing
transportation costs. Hotelling, and later Boulding (1996), generalized the idea of
socially wasteful agglomerations to a broad range of social settings. This negative
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assessment was later tempered by arguments emphasizing the beneﬁts of spatial ag-
glomerations, which help consumers by economizing on shopping costs in terms of
shopping time, transportation cost (Eaton and Lipsey, 1976, 1979) and uncertainty
reduction (Wolinsky,1983; Dudey, 1990). Following numerous papers on eﬃciency
gains from agglomeration, however, new negative assessments appeared, for exam-
ple Dudey (1993) on welfare-decreasing agglomerations. More recent theoretical and
empirical work emphasizes the role of physical distance in the production function—
indivisibility in production (Kanemoto, 1990), labor market pooling (Rosenthal and
Strange, 2001), and complementarity between workers and ﬁrms (Andersson, Burgess
and Lane, 2007)—to better characterize eﬃciency of agglomerations. Rather than try-
ing to harmonize contradictory normative theories (Fischer and Harrington, 1996),
this paper attempts to exploit the mixed normative message in the agglomeration lit-
erature. This follows Gigerenzer et al (1999) and Gigerenzer and Selten (2002), whose
normative approach—referred to as ecological rationality—seeks to analyze when de-
cision procedures are well matched, or badly matched, to decision environments. The
matching concept underlying ecological rationality stands in contrast to universal,
context-free and content-blind normative criteria for evaluating rationality, such as
transitivity, the Kolmogorov axioms of probability theory, or the Savage axioms of
expected utility theory.1
1Context-dependent normative analysis does not imply relativity, as there remain many compelling reasons other
than violations of consistency axioms for policy makers to be concerned about behavioral underpinnings of spatial
agglomerations. Berry (1961), for example, argues that steepness of city-size distribution curves is inversely related
to economic development and, therefore, that policy makers interested in economic development have good reason
to be concerned with diﬀerent forms of agglomeration as a primary issue in planning. Muiz, and Galindo (2005)
present evidence on suburban agglomerations and environmental impacts. And Anas and Rhee (2007) demonstrate
the sensitivity of normative evaluations of policies that concern spatial agglomerations to apparently innocuous as-
sumptions such as exogenous agricultural land rents in areas surrounding cities. Similarly, Turner (2007) shows that
small coordination and free-rider microstructures lead to a large divergence between equilibrium and socially eﬃcient
spatial distributions.
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The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model and main
theoretical results. Section 3 discusses these results in the context of three distinct
academic literatures. Section 4 returns to the problem of underutilized resources in
urban areas with a conclusion oﬀering interpretations of the model as applied to the
case of urban ghettos in the U.S.
2 The Model
The model considers ﬁrms that have two primary choice variables: how much private
information to acquire about locations, and choice of location. Following exten-
sive theoretical (Prescott and Visscher, 1977; Kogut, 1983) and empirical literatures
(Chang, 1995; Chang and Rosenzweig 2001; Chung, 2001) on sequential entry and
exit, this model assumes that each ﬁrm makes the joint decision of information ac-
quisition and location choice at a single point in a longer sequence comprised of
similar joint decisions by other ﬁrms. To investigate the eﬀect of a ﬁrm’s position
in this temporal sequence on information acquisition—in particular, the extent to
which ﬁrms condition their choices of location on previous movers’ locations instead
of collecting independent information on their own—all ﬁrms’ objective functions are
assumed to diﬀer only in the sets of information available for conditioning expected
proﬁt. Thus, heterogeneous values of maximized expected proﬁt arise solely because
of heterogeneous positions in the sequence of moves and, consequently, the diﬀerent
sets of information ﬁrms acquire.
To ﬁx ideas, the simplest possible temporal sequence of decisions is considered:
two ﬁrms each of which chooses a quantity of information and location to maximize
expected proﬁt. The ﬁrst mover is referred to as Firm 1. The second mover is referred
to as Firm 2, and moves after observing Firm 1’s choice of location.
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Locations are indexed on the unbounded real line. Because the focus is information
acquisition rather than strategic considerations or other interesting problems such as
multiple equilibria, Knightian uncertainty, and complex dynamics, the model takes
a shortcut by assuming the existence of a unique proﬁt-maximizing location a ∈ ,
referred to as the ideal location. This unique proﬁt-maximizing location, a, is assumed
to be the same for both ﬁrms.
Information acquisition is important in the model because a is unknown to both
ﬁrms. Firms must therefore condition predictions of a on private signals they acquire,
denoted x1 and x2 for Firms 1 and 2, respectively. In addition to x2, Firm 2 also
conditions its expectations of a on the observed location of Firm 1, which is denoted
y1. Firm 2’s choice of location is denoted y2.
Quantities of private information are denoted θ1 and θ2, 0 ≤ θi ≤ 1, i = 1, 2.
The “quantity of information” θi represents R
2 in a univariate regression of a on
the privately acquired signal xi. Larger θi means that Firm i chooses more private
information or, equivalently, lower conditional variance of a given xi.
Privately acquired signals come from a variety of sources, including public data
sets and private vendors, both of which incur time, processing and sometimes explicit
ﬁnancial costs. The model captures the costs of acquiring private information with a
continuously diﬀerentiable and weakly increasing cost function C(θ), with C(0) = 0
and C ′(θ) ≥ 0. Firm 1’s location is a crucial piece of information for Firm 2. Under
the assumption that this information is easily observable, it makes sense to keep it
distinct from the privately acquired signal x2 and without any eﬀect on Firm 2’s total
cost of information C(θ2).
If either ﬁrm (or both) knew where the best location was (i.e., knew a), proﬁt
would be given by the exogenous parameter π0, interpreted as maximized proﬁt in
the ideal case of full knowledge with zero information costs. Given uncertainty about
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a, however, ﬁrms experience actual costs from two separate categories. First is the cost
of deviating from a, which should be interpreted as reduced sales, extra transportation
costs, or higher taxes. Second is the cost of private information, which is acquired
speciﬁcally to reduce the expected deviation of the ﬁrms actual location from a. With
quadratic costs of deviating from a, the proﬁt function takes the form π0− (yi−a)2−
C(θi), i = 1, 2. Because a is uncertain, the ex ante objective functions are stated in
expected form:
π1(y1, θ1) = π0 − E[(y1 − a)2|x1; θ1]− C(θ1), (1)
π2(y2, θ2) = π0 − E[(y2 − a)2|y1(θ1), x2; θ2]− C(θ2). (2)
Note that Firm 1 and Firm 2’s expected proﬁt functions diﬀer only in the information
upon which expectations are conditioned. The notation makes clear that Firm 1’s
expectation of expressions involving a is conditioned by its private information x1,
which depends on its choice of θ1. Firm 2’s expectation of expressions involving
a is conditioned by Firm 1’s location y1(θ1) and Firm 2’s privately acquired signal
x2. Firm 2’s expectations depend on its choice of θ2. The notation in equation (2)
expresses y1 as a function of θ1 to make the dependence of Firm 2’s information
acquisition on Firm 1’s choice of information explicit.
Expected deviations from a, which appear in each ﬁrm’s proﬁt, can be decomposed
as follows:
E[(y1 − a)2|x1; θ1] = (y1 − E[a|x1; θ1])2 + var(a|x1; θ1), (3)
E[(y2 − a)2|y1(θ1), x2; θ2] = (y2 − E[a|y1(θ1), x2; θ2])2 + var(a|y1(θ1), x1; θ2). (4)
Because the ﬁrst terms on the right hand side of (3) and (4) have unique minima
at zero, and because yi appears nowhere else in Firm i’s objective function, optimal
location choice rules are given by:
y∗1 = E[a|x1; θ1] and y∗2 = E[a|y1(θ1), x2; θ2]. (5)
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Whenever y∗1 is linear in x1, then y
∗
2 → y∗1 as θ2 → 0. The reason for this is that Firm
2 receives an undistorted version of Firm 1’s private signal while acquiring no private
information of its own, which implies that Firm 2 must have the same expectation of
a and consequently choose the same location as Firm 1.
After substituting (3) into (1), the ﬁrst-order condition for θ1 is:
2(y1 − E[a|x1; θ1])∂E[a|x1; θ1]
∂θ1
− ∂var(a|x1; θ1)
∂θ1
− ∂C(θ1)
∂θ1
= 0, (6)
but because the global solution for y∗1 in (5) makes the ﬁrst term in parentheses
on the left-hand side of (6) uniformly zero, this ﬁrst-order condition simpliﬁes to
−∂var(a|x1;θ1)
∂θ1
= ∂C(θ1)
∂θ1
. This requires that Firm 1 choose θ1 to set the marginal
reduction in conditional variance of a equal to the marginal cost of information. A
solution to the ﬁrst-order condition for θ1 may not always exist and, even when it
does, it may not correspond to a global maximum. The boundary values, θ1 = 0 and
θ1 = 1, must also be checked. The choice θ1 = 0 maximizes expected proﬁt when
information is too expensive to justify its acquisition at any level, in which case Firm 1
locates at the unconditional mean, y1 = μa, and achieves expected proﬁt π0−σ2a. The
choice θ1 = 1 represents cases where Firm 1 acquires maximally precise information,
implying that var(a|x1; θ1)|θ1=1 = 0, and proﬁt π0−C(1), which is certain in this case
rather than expected.
Given the real-world policy problems associated with the hypothesis of imitation
causing ineﬃcient spatial agglomerations that fail to utilize proﬁtable opportunities
elsewhere, the most interesting case to consider is when Firm 1 acquires information
and Firm 2 does not: θ1 > 0 and θ2 = 0, referred to as absolute imitation. One seeks to
identify the conditions under which imitation of this kind is consistent with expected-
proﬁt maximization. Thus, it is assumed that the global maximizer θ∗1 lies on the strict
interior of the unit interval: that is, π1(E[a|x1; θ∗1], θ∗1) > max{π0 − σ2a, π0 − C(1)}.2
2A suﬃcient but not necessary condition for existence of an interior solution for θ1 is that the conditional variance
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Conditions are also sought under which Firm 2 acquires private information, but
strictly less information than Firm 1: 0 < θ∗2 < θ
∗
1, referred to as partial imitation,
because y∗2 and y
∗
1 are closer on average than they would be if location choices were
based solely on private information.
Turning to Firm 2’s condition for optimal information acquisition, the ﬁrst-order
condition for θ2 is:
−∂var(a|y1(θ1), x2; θ2)
∂θ2
=
∂C(θ2)
∂θ2
, (7)
which makes clear the dependence of Firm 2’s choice of θ2 on θ1. Again, this ﬁrst-
order condition may not have a solution, and its solution may be dominated by
choices at the boundaries. In cases where −∂var(a|y1(θ1),x2;θ2)
∂θ2
< ∂C(θ2)
∂θ2
for all θ2, Firm
2’s marginal beneﬁt of private information is never greater than its marginal cost.
The following condition describes when Firm 2 acquires no private information.
Result 1 (Absolute Imitation): Provided that C(θ) is convex, that var(a|y1(θ1), x2; θ2)
is convex in θ2 (i.e., Firm 2’s marginal beneﬁt of private information acquisition is
decreasing in θ2), and provided that the following inequality holds:
−∂var(a|y1(θ1), x2; θ2)
∂θ2
|θ2=0 <
∂C(0)
∂θ
< −∂var(a|x1; θ1)
∂θ1
|θ1=0, (8)
then Firm 2 absolutely imitates Firm 1. Absolute imitation means that Firm 2
acquires no information on its own, θ∗2 = 0, while Firm 1 acquires a strictly positive
quantity of information, θ∗1 > 0. If Firm 1’s location is linear in its private signal,
then this condition also implies that Firm 2 will choose the same location as Firm 1,
y∗2 = y
∗
1.
Condition (8) relies on the fact that, if marginal beneﬁt of private information is
less than marginal cost starting from an initial position of zero information, then there
is never any incentive to acquire information. Firm 2’s marginal beneﬁt is decreasing
of a given x1 is weakly convex in θ1, which holds, for example, in case a and x1 are jointly normal, as shown in later
sections.
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in own private information acquisition (by convexity of Firm 2’s conditional variance),
and marginal cost is increasing (by convexity of the cost function). Therefore, the ﬁrst
inequality rules out Firm 2 acquiring private information, and the second inequality
ensures that Firm 1 acquires some.3
2.1 Joint normality
To examine the interdependence of the ﬁrms’ levels of information acquisition using
tractable functional forms, attention now turns to the consequences of assuming joint
normality:
a ∼ N(μa, σ2a), x1 = a + 1, and x2 = a + 2, (9)
where i is normal, with mean −μa (so that, without loss of generality, E[xi] = 0),
and independent from a, for i = 1, 2. Thus, each ﬁrm’s acquisition of information can
be expressed as:
θi ≡ [corr(xi, a)]2 = (σ2a)2/(σ2aσ2i ) = σ2a/σ2i , (10)
where σ2i ≡ var(xi), i = 1, 2.
Joint normality allows conditional expectations to be expressed explicitly. Recall-
ing that x1 has mean zero by deﬁnition, Firm 1’s conditional expectation of a [and
by equation (5), its expected-proﬁt-maximizing location] is:
y∗1 = μa + [cov(x1, a)/σ
2
1]x1 = μa + θ1x1. (11)
Conditional variance of a given Firm 1’s observed signal is given by the convenient
formula:
var[a|x1] = σ2a − [cov(x1, a)]2/σ21 = σ2a(1− θ1). (12)
The condition under which Firm 1 acquires a positive quantity of information [the
second inequality in (8), which requires that marginal cost of the ﬁrst unit of infor-
3For more on the value of information and its interactions with risk aversion, not considered further here, see
Willinger (1989), Hilton (1981), and Eeckhoudt, Godfroid and Gollier (2001).
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mation is less than its marginal beneﬁt] simpliﬁes to C ′(0) < σ2a. When this condition
is satisﬁed, the interior solution θ∗1 solves:
σ2a = C
′(θ1). (13)
After making the substitutions σ21 = σ
2
a/θ1, σ
2
2 = σ
2
a/θ2, and var(y1) = θ
2
1(σ
2
a/θ1) =
θ1σ
2
a, Firm 2’s conditional expectations, E[a|y1, x2] and var(a|y1, x2), can be expressed
in terms of θ1 and θ2:
E[a|y1(θ1), x2; θ2] = μa + [cov(y1, a) cov(x2, a)]
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
var(y1) cov(y1, x2)
cov(y1, x2) var(x2)
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
−1 ⎡
⎢⎢⎣
y1(θ1)− μa
x2
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
= μa + [θ1σ
2
a σ
2
a]
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
θ1σ
2
a θ1σ
2
a
θ1σ
2
a σ
2
a/θ2
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
−1 ⎡
⎢⎢⎣
θ1x1
x2
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ (14)
= μa +
θ1(1− θ2)
1− θ1θ2 x1 +
θ2(1− θ1)
1− θ1θ2 x2, (15)
and:
var(a|y1(θ1), x2; θ2) = σ2a − [θ1σ2a σ2a]
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
θ1σ
2
a θ1σ
2
a
θ1σ
2
a σ
2
a/θ2
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
−1 ⎡
⎢⎢⎣
θ1σ
2
a
σ2a
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ (16)
= σ2a[1− (θ1 + θ2 − 2θ1θ2)/(1− θ1θ2)]. (17)
Equation (15) implies that the more information Firm 1 acquires, the less weight
Firm 2 places on its own private signal (i.e., ∂
∂θ1
[θ2(1 − θ1)/(1 − θ1θ2)] = −θ2(1 −
θ2)/(1 − θ1θ2)2 ≤ 0). As long as θ1 > θ2, equation (15) also shows that Firm 2 will
weight Firm 1’s information more than its own, and if θ2 = 0, locate exactly where
Firm 1 does: y∗2 = y
∗
1 = μa + θ1x1.
The following expression, which is positive, measures the marginal beneﬁt to Firm
2 of its private information:
−∂var(a|y1(θ1), x2; θ2)
∂θ2
= σ2a(1− θ1)2/(1− θ1θ2)2. (18)
12
Taking the second derivative with respect to θ2 reveals a negative sign, which shows
convexity of conditional variance [i.e., the second derivative of var(a|y1(θ1), x2; θ2)
without the negative sign is positive], as required in Result 1. To investigate whether
the other part of Result 1’s absolute imitation condition holds, a speciﬁcation of the
cost function is required, which subsequent sections provide. If both ﬁrms choose
interior quantities of information, then they will equate marginal beneﬁt of private
information with marginal cost. For any strictly increasing cost function, Firm 2 will
acquire less private information than Firm 1 if and only if its marginal beneﬁt is less
than Firm 1’s. This clearly holds in the case of joint normality:
−∂var(a|y1(θ1), x2; θ2)
∂θ2
= σ2a[(1− θ1)/(1− θ1θ2)]2 ≤ σ2a = −
∂var(a|x1; θ1)
∂θ1
. (19)
Result 2 (Firm 2 demands less private information than Firm 1): For
strictly increasing C(θ) and joint normality of a, x1 and x2, Firm 2 demands less
private information than Firm 1: θ∗2 ≤ θ∗1. This result follows from the fact that
Firm 1’s marginal beneﬁt of private information is uniformly greater than Firm 2’s:
−∂var(a|y1(θ1),x2;θ2)
∂θ2
≤ −∂var(a|x1;θ1)
∂θ1
, as demonstrated in (19).
2.2 Example with exponential cost of information
Suppose the cost function has the following (inverse) exponential form:
C(θ) = −c log(1− θ), c > 0. (20)
The key feature of this cost function is that the ﬁrst unit of information has positive
marginal cost c and approaches inﬁnity as θ approaches 1. Solving (13) leads to
θ∗1 = 1− c/σ2a for 0 ≤ c ≤ σ2a, and 0 otherwise. Referring back to Result 1, one can
observe that, with c < σ2a, the condition for absolute imitation holds:
−∂var(a|y1(θ1), x2; θ2)
∂θ2
|θ2=0 = σ2a(1− θ∗1)2 = (c/σ2a)c
< c =
∂C(0)
∂θ
≤ σ2a = −
∂var(a|x1; θ1)
∂θ1
|θ1=0. (21)
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Thus, with the cost function (20), Firm 1 acquires a positive quantity of private
information (provided that the marginal cost of the ﬁrst unit, c, is not prohibitively
high) and Firm 2 absolutely imitates Firm 1 without acquiring any private information
of its own. Without the beneﬁt of observing Firm 1’s location, Firm 2 would have
acquired the same positive quantity of private information that Firm 1 did. But
because the observation of Firm 1’s location reduces Firm 2’s marginal beneﬁt of
private information so much that it lies uniformly below marginal cost, Firm 2 never
acquires private information after observing Firm 1’s location. Firm 2 locates exactly
where Firm 1 locates, y∗2 = y
∗
1 , illustrating the case of absolute imitation described in
Result 1.
2.3 Aggregate eﬃciency and absolute imitation
Firm 1 cannot capture the positive informational externality its choice of location
provides to Firm 2. To measure the aggregate ineﬃciency resulting from this infor-
mational externality, it is useful to compare aggregate proﬁts between two cases: the
decentralized case in which both ﬁrms make information and location choices on their
own, versus the centralized case in which a central planner simultaneously chooses
θ1, θ2, y1 and y2 to maximize the aggregate proﬁt function π1(y1, θ1) + π2(y2, θ2). In
the centralized case where y1 and y2 are chosen by the central planner to equal each
ﬁrm’s respective conditional expectation of a, the information acquisition variables
θ1 and θ2 must be chosen simultaneously to maximize:
2π0−σ2a(1−θ1)−σ2a[1−(θ1+θ2−2θ1θ2)/(1−θ1θ2)]+c log(1−θ1)+c log(1−θ2). (22)
The central planner’s ﬁrst-order condition for θ2 is the same as that faced by Firm 2.
Therefore, the central planner also chooses θ2 = 0 and y2 = y1. The central planner,
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however, chooses a substantially larger quantity of information for Firm 1:
θ1 = 1− 1
2
c/σ2a =
1
2
+
1
2
θ∗1. (23)
The expression above relates the central planner’s optimal value of θ1 to Firm 1’s own
choice in the decentralized regime, showing that the central planner always chooses
a larger value. This increase in information raises aggregate proﬁts above the level
achieved in the decentralized case by the amount c(1+ log(1/2)). To gauge how large
a change in aggregate proﬁts this would be in percentage terms, one needs to refer
to aggregate proﬁt in the decentralized case: 2π0 − 2c + c log(c/σ2a). Thus, the per-
centage change depends on the magnitude of c relative to π0, which can be adjusted
to achieve arbitrarily large percentage changes, provided c > 0, although only as a
possibility claim without compelling motivation. These formulas show that the level
of change in aggregate proﬁts, as a measure of ineﬃciency based on the thought ex-
periment of moving from decentralized to centralized regimes, is proportional to the
cost-of-information parameter c. Therefore, ineﬃciency is most severe when informa-
tion acquisition is expensive, and least severe when it is cheap. This claim depends
critically on speciﬁcation of C(θ), as the next section shows aggregate eﬃciency to
be nonmonotonic in c when the cost function is quadratic.
2.4 Quadratic cost of information
While the case of absolute imitation nicely represents the real-world phenomenon
of imitation and the complete absence of any cost-beneﬁt analysis of unoccupied
locations, the intermediate case is interesting as well, where Firm 2 conditions on
Firm 1’s location but also acquires private information. The remaining analysis in
the paper relies on the following quadratic speciﬁcation of the cost-of-information
function:
C(θ) = cθ2/2. (24)
15
The key feature of this cost function is that the ﬁrst unit of information has zero
marginal cost, implying that both ﬁrms always acquire positive quantities of private
information. Solving (13) leads to:
θ∗1 = σ
2
a/c, for σ
2
a ≤ c, and 1 otherwise, (25)
or θ∗1 = min{σ2a/c, 1}.
With quadratic costs, Firm 2’s objective function can be written as:
= π0 − (y2 − E[a|y1(θ1), x2; θ2])2 − σ2a[1− (θ1 + θ2 − 2θ1θ2)/(1− θ1θ2)]− cθ22/2.
The ﬁrst-order condition for θ2 is:
σ2a(1− θ1)2/(1− θ1θ2)2 − cθ2 = 0. (26)
Assuming σ2a ≤ c, one divides (26) through by c and substitutes θ1 = σ2a/c, which
gives rise to a cubic in θ2 that turns out to have a unique solution on the unit interval.
Following these steps, it is straightforward to re-express (26) using the characteristic
equation h(θ2):
h(θ2) ≡ θ21θ32 − 2θ1θ22 + θ2 − θ1(1− θ1)2 = 0. (27)
Because h(0) = −θ1(1− θ1)2 ≤ 0, and h(1) = (1− θ1)3 ≥ 0, there exists at least one
solution on the interval 0 ≤ θ2 ≤ 1. To rule out the possibility of multiple solutions on
the closed unit interval, one may examine possible nonmonotonicities of h(θ2), which
must occur at zeros of the equation:
∂h(θ2)
∂θ2
= 3θ21θ
2
2 − 4θ1θ2 + 1 = (1− θ1θ2)(1− 3θ1θ2) = 0. (28)
There are two points at which the sign of the curve’s slope can change: θ2 = 1/(3θ1)
and θ2 = 1/θ1. The second of these is necessarily to the right of θ2 = 1, implying
that (27) has exactly one solution on the unit interval.
Result 3 (Partial Imitation): Given jointly normal a, x1 and x2, and non-
decreasing cost function C(θ) such that C ′(0) < σ2a(1 − θ∗1), Firm 2’s demand for
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information is strictly positive, although strictly less than Firm 1’s demand for infor-
mation: 0 < θ∗2 < θ
∗
1. In this case, Firm 2’s location choice rule can be described as
“partial imitation” because Firm 2 chooses a location near, although not exactly the
same, as Firm 1. Firm 2’s choice of location depends in part on its private signal x2.
Partial imitation implies that y2 and y1 are closer than they would be if both ﬁrm’s
relied only on private information.
Figure 1 shows individually proﬁt-maximizing levels of information (i.e., θ∗1 and
θ∗2), chosen by Firms 1 and 2 respectively, for the entire range of (inverse) information
costs. The ﬁgure also shows aggregate proﬁt, π1(y
∗
1, θ
∗
1)+π2(y
∗
2, θ
∗
2), in the centralized
(topmost curve) and decentralized (second curve from the top) cases. The gap be-
tween the two aggregate proﬁt curves, which varies nonmonotonically over the range
of information costs, provides one measure of the social cost of imitation. Comparison
of the this gap at the extremes versus middle of the range of information costs reveals
an interesting nonmonotonicity for the quadratic speciﬁcation of C(θ): the social cost
of imitation is negligible in environments where information is either very scarce or
very abundant, and maximal in the intermediate range of information costs.
This result is diﬀerent than what was reported above for the exponential cost
function. For exponential costs, the cost parameter was bounded from above and,
even for cost parameters where neither ﬁrm acquired information in the decentralized
case, the central planner would always demand a minimum of θ1 = 1/2. Thus,
the gap between centralized and decentralized aggregate proﬁts was maximal where
information costs were highest. In contrast, for the case of quadratic costs, if the cost
parameter is high enough that neither ﬁrm demands information, then it does not
pay for the central planner to acquire any information either.
Another interesting feature of Figure 1 is nonmonotonicity of θ∗2. Whereas Firm
1 always demands more information as c falls, Firm 2’s demand for information
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can go in either direction in response to a drop in the cost of information. When
information is very expensive, neither ﬁrm acquires much information and both locate
near the unconditional mean μa. Because Firm 1’s information reduces the marginal
beneﬁt of Firm 2’s information in all cases, Firm 2 acquires even less information than
Firm 1, weighting Firm 1’s location more than its own signal. At the other extreme
when information is very cheap, Firm 1 acquires so much of the available information
about good locations that Firm 2 receives little marginal beneﬁt from its own private
information. In this case, the reduction in Firm 2’s marginal beneﬁt of information
dominates its increase in demand owing to lower acquisition costs.
The variable θ∗2 provides one natural (inverse) measure of the magnitude of imita-
tion, because it represents the extent to which Firm 2 collects private information (i.e.,
not imitating Firm 1). Alternatively, the magnitude of imitation could be quantiﬁed
by the squared distance between the ﬁrms’ locations:
(y∗2 − y∗1)2 = [
(1− θ1)θ2
1− θ1θ2 ]
2(x2 − θ1x1)2, (29)
which, in expectation, equals:
E[(y∗2 − y∗1)2] = θ2(1− θ1)2σ2a/(1− θ1θ2). (30)
The distance between the ﬁrms’ locations is small when θ2 is near zero or θ1 is near
1. The expected distance given by the square root of the expression in (30) reaches a
maximum of 30 percent of the standard error σa. If σa is interpreted as the average
distance of the ideal location from its unconditional mean, then with this parameteri-
zation, ﬁrms will on average be closer to each other than the ideal location is from its
mean. Another point of interest not directly observable in Figure 1 is that the central
planner’s solution always prescribes more total information than in the decentralized
case. That is, the sum of quantities of information, θ1 + θ2, chosen by the planner
is always greater than in the decentralized economy, with a maximum diﬀerence of
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around 0.35.
For a more detailed view of changes in optimal values of θ1, θ2, and aggregate
proﬁt moving from the decentralized to centralized regime, Figure 2 shows percentage
changes in each of these variables across the same range of inverse information costs.
The dotted line at the top of Figure 2 shows percentage change in θ1, whose uniformly
positive sign indicates that the centralized solution always calls for Firm 1 to acquire
more information than it chooses on its own. This makes sense, because Firm 1
cannot internalize the beneﬁt it provides to Firm 2 in the decentralized regime. In
contrast, Firm 2 usually acquires less information in the centralized regime, but not
always. The cases where the central planner dictates that both ﬁrms acquire more
information correspond to environments in which the cost of information acquisition
is relatively large (σ2a/c near zero on the x-axis). The range of exogenous parameters
in which both ﬁrms acquire more private information in the centralized regime reﬂects
synergistic complementarity in the two ﬁrms’ value of private information, which is
nowhere present when using the exponential cost function speciﬁcation introduced
earlier. For quadratic acquisition costs and relatively high values of c, the marginal
beneﬁt of Firm 2’s private information increases when the central planner raises Firm
1’s level of private information.4 The solid line in Figure 2 is the percentage change
in aggregate proﬁt, which is always positive because the central planner optimally
utilizes information externalities to achieve greater aggregate proﬁt.
2.5 Discrete choice in acquiring a signal of ﬁxed precision
It is sometimes the case that ﬁrms cannot exert continuous control over the precision
of private signals they acquire. For example, a consulting ﬁrm might oﬀer a report on
4A related point concerns the nonmonotonicity of Firm 2’s response to a change in θ1. This can be seen analytically
in the indeterminate sign of
∂θ∗2
∂θ1
, observed by implicit diﬀerentiation of the characteristic equation (27) and noting
that
∂h(θ2)
∂θ2
is positive while
∂h(θ2)
∂θ1
is of indeterminate sign.
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retail sites in a particular city for a ﬁxed price. Similarly, marketing studies priced
proportionally to sample size, holding the list of predictors ﬁxed, would not provide
purchasers of these services control over R2. Another example is the decision to spend
in-house research time analyzing Census data, which could lead to diﬀerent model
speciﬁcations with distinct R2, but not continuous control over R2, since the list of
Census variables is exogenously ﬁxed.
To investigate the consequences of discretizing the information acquisition deci-
sion, this section considers an information market in which both ﬁrms make a binary
decision of whether to acquire a privately available signal with ﬁxed precision θ¯, at
cost c(θ¯)2/2. Note that the error terms in the two ﬁrms’ private signals are inde-
pendent, although the signals themselves are of course correlated and the R2 of each
are identical. This implies that, without the signal, Firm 1 faces expected costs of
deviating from a equal to σ2a. Acquiring the signal, Firm 1 faces expected costs of
deviating from a equal to σ2a(1 − θ¯). Thus, Firm 1’s reduction in variance (i.e., in-
crease in expected proﬁt owing to decreased expected deviation from a), achieved as
a result of acquiring the signal, equals σ2aθ¯. Firm 1 acquires the signal if and only if:
c(θ¯)2/2 < σ2aθ¯, or θ¯ < 2σ
2
a/c. (31)
If Firm 1 acquires the signal but Firm 2 does not, then Firm 2 faces expected
costs of deviating from a equal to σ2a(1 − θ¯). If both ﬁrms acquire private signals,
then Firm 2’s expected cost of deviating from a equals σ2a(1− θ¯)/(1+ θ¯). Thus, Firm
2’s increase in expected proﬁt by acquiring the signal is σ2aθ¯(1 − θ¯)/(1 + θ¯), and it
decides to acquire the signal if and only if:
c(θ¯)2/2 < σ2aθ¯(1− θ¯)/(1 + θ¯), or θ¯(1 + θ¯)/(1− θ¯) < 2σ2a/c. (32)
Figure 3 shows all possible discrete-information-acquisition environments indexed
by two exogenous parameters: the cost of deviating from the ideal location a rel-
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ative to the cost of private information acquisition σ2a/c, and the ﬁxed precision of
information θ¯. In the unshaded region [where both inequalities (31) and (32) fail to
hold], neither ﬁrm acquires information because the beneﬁt of information relative
to its cost is low. In the lightly shaded region [where (31) holds but (32) does not],
Firm 1 acquires the private signal and Firm 2 does not, although Firm 2 would have
acquired it had Firm 2 been ﬁrst mover. In the darkly shaded region [where (31)
and (32) both hold], both ﬁrms acquire private information. Thus, proﬁt maximizing
ﬁrms in environments with binary choice of acquisition of information may choose
to imitate ﬁrst movers’ locations rather than engaging in costly private information
acquisition, as was the case in continuous acquisition environments.
3 Discussion
Rather than evaluating shortcuts, or heuristics, according to context-free domain-
general normative criteria, the aim of this paper is to explain when the imitation
heuristic works well in terms of social eﬃciency and where it is, unfortunately, mis-
matched to the decision environment, contributing to persistently under-developed
regions in central cities. There is a long and distinguished literature on spatial
agglomerations of people and commerce (Christels, 1933; Lo¨sch, 1938; Zipf, 1949;
Berry, 1961). Economists have advanced formal models of spatial organization, from
Hotelling (1929) to Krugman (1993), and beyond.5 Economists have also contributed
a rich theoretical literature explaining why imitation is individually advantageous
in various settings (Sinclair, 1990; Welch, 1992; Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandhani,
Hirshleifer and Welch, 1992; Ellison and Fudenberg, 1995; Vega-Redondo, 1997;
5Boschma and Frenken (2007) provide a lucid discussion of economic geographys institutional focus in contrast
with new economic geographys neoclassical methodology, which attempts to explain uneven distributions of economic
activity in terms of universal processes driven by mobile factors of production.
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Schlag 1998, 1999; Oﬀerman, Potters, and Sonnemans, 2002; Apesteguia, Huck, and
Oechssler, 2003; Dutta and Prasad, 2004; Anderson, Ellison and Fudenberg, 2005),
with interesting empirical applications as well.6 There is, however, very little in the
economics literature marrying these two themes of imitation and location choice.7
Venerable lines of economic research develop models of location choice (Hotelling,
1929; Alonso, 1964; Muth, 1968) as well as spatial agglomerations and their statis-
tical determinants (Konishi, 2005; Kobrin, 1985). The issue of ethnic enclaves and
spatial patterns resulting from individual decisions about where to move also relates
to the problem of imitation in location choice, at least from an abstract modeling
perspective (Gross and Schmitt, 2000; Huﬀ, 1962). Not all those who analyze spa-
tial patterns focus on processes of agglomeration. Some argue that Hotelling-type
economies should produce dispersion rather than concentration (d’Aspremont and
Gabszewicz, 1979). Similarly, Kain (1968) focuses on decentralization (i.e., the undo-
ing of spatial agglomerations) and the unequal impacts of suburbanization on labor
market opportunities for blacks and other ethnic minorities. According to Glaeser,
Hanushek and Quigley (2004), Kain’s spatial explanations for persistently high un-
employment in minority neighborhoods played a large role in directing the attention
of economists to disparities based on race and ethnicity.
6Rodgers (1952) describes dramatic spatial concentrations of steel production in the U.S., and the possibility that
these concentrations might undermine national security. Similarly, Rees (1978) describes spatial concentrations in the
rubber industry. Mansﬁeld (1961) provides empirical evidence linking ﬁrms’ decisions to introduce new techniques of
production to the proportion of ﬁrms already using that technique, in line with widely used gravity models in the
social sciences. Geertz (1978) observes spatial agglomeration according to product type in bazaars in Algeria. Walcott
(1990) ﬁnds agglomerations of biotech ﬁrms in Atlanta suggestive of imitation as a strategy for coping with scarcity of
information. Fairen (1996) argues that imitative behavior may best explain why automobile manufacturers produce
very similar models of cars. And Seamans (2006) investigates spatial clustering in the cable television industry.
7One exception is the experimental Hotelling economy analyzed by Camacho-Cuena et al (2005), demonstrating
spatial agglomerations in the lab, but not always as the result of decision-making processes that follow the stan-
dard model. The international ﬁnance literature, too, frequently studies interdependencies among ﬁrms’ investment
decisions (Kindleberger, 1983), and imitation is an established theme in international trade (Schmitt, 1995).
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In contrast to economics, the administrative management literature has devoted
considerable attention to imitation in location choice (Guillen, 2002; Haunschild,
1993; Haveman, 1993). Descriptive models in this literature focus on how exit and
entry of other ﬁrms allow managers to make inferences about expected levels of prof-
itability, leading to correlated entry and exit decisions across ﬁrms (Baum, Li and
Usher, 2000; Miner and Haunschild, 1997), which is consistent with the formal model
presented in this paper. Another reason for imitation mentioned in this literature
is sociological imperatives to adhere to norms (Abrahamson and Rosenkopf, 1993),
according to which it pays to imitate peer decisions even in the absence of internal
reasons for adopting strategies that peer ﬁrms have adopted. Legitimacy is put for-
ward as still another reason why managers may eschew independent approaches in
favor of imitation of peers whose actions are perceived as legitimate (DiMaggio and
Powell, 1983; Haunschild and Miner, 1997; Fligstein, 1985). An interesting aspect of
this literature is that, in many of these models, the more predictable the environment,
the stronger the incentive to imitate (Argote, Beckman and Epple, 1990), which is
opposite of the model in this paper. There is also a vast operations research literature
applying constrained optimization to spatial decision problems.
Empirical accounts from interview studies (Schwartz, 1987, 2004; Bewley, 1999;
Berg, 2007) favor the position that ﬁrms rely on simplifying rules of thumb, or heuris-
tics. Wiessbourd (1999) reports that businesses in Chicago use simple rules of thumb
to decide on locations, which work well in environments with lots of information,
but tend to reinforce negative stereotypes and leave proﬁtable opportunities unex-
ploited in low information environments. Anecdotal evidence corroborates the large
role of imitation put forward in this paper. For example, according to one individual
involved in location decisions for the German discount supermarket chain Lidl, its
location decisions follow a simple rule of thumb: build a store wherever Aldi, Lidl ’ s
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primary competitor, has a location (Scheibene, 2007, personal communication).
Given that ﬁrms in the real world condition location decisions on observed locations
of others, it is natural to investigate whether imitation can be rationalized within
the proﬁt maximizing framework. The model presented in Section 2 tackles this
problem and the more important issue, from a policy perspective, of the aggregate
consequences of shortcut decision rules, or heuristics. The central question is whether
under-utilization of urban resources results from a process in which ﬁrms consider
employing those resources and wind up deciding they are unproﬁtable, or whether
the imitation heuristic, perhaps suitable for some investment environments, leads to
ineﬃcient clustering in favored suburban locations and systematic neglect of entire
regions within cities.
The magnitude of the abandoned property problem in US central cities is apparent
in the economics literature as early as the 1970s (Stegman and Rasmussen, 1980).
Whereas the model of Caplin and Leahy (1998) provides a general rationalization
for abandonment or under-utilization, the model in this paper has the advantage
of identifying conditions in the external environment necessary for tension to exist
between the individual advantages and social consequences (in terms of aggregate
economic eﬃciency) of imitation.
4 Conclusion
The model presented in this paper draws on empirical accounts of spatial concentra-
tion in well-established retail centers of aﬄuent suburbs by ﬁrms that ineﬃciently
overlook proﬁtable opportunities in urban neighborhoods (Berg, 2007; Helling and
Sawicki, 2003; Sabety and Carlson, 2003; Francica, 2000; Weissbourd, 1999). Seeking
a better understanding of opportunistic information sharing that leads to imitation,
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the model demonstrates that imitation is consistent with expected proﬁt maximiza-
tion, although it usually results in lower aggregate proﬁt than would be achieved by
a benevolent central planner. The benchmark relative to which eﬃciency is measured
does not assume a new institution for pooling information resources. Rather, it takes
the sequence of moves as given and simultaneously chooses all ﬁrms’ choice variables
(i.e., Firm 1 and Firm 2’s quantities of private information acquisition and choices of
location) to maximize aggregate proﬁt. Firms are assumed to be identical except that
later movers can make use of earlier movers’ locations as an additional conditioning
variable.
As emphasized already, imitation in location choice is not uniformly bad for ag-
gregate eﬃciency. There is a genuine positive externality ﬂowing from early to later
movers. Imitation usually helps exploit this positive externality to some extent, but
not as fully as aggregate eﬃciency requires. As shown in Figure 2, over most of the
range of the cost-of-information parameter c, the central planner prescribes more in-
formation for Firm 1 and less for Firm 2. Thus, in this parameter range, the central
planner fully exploits the positive externality by increasing, not reducing, the extent
of imitation. When c is very large, however, the central planner requires that both
ﬁrms acquire additional private information, implying that a reduction in imitation
is needed to achieve social eﬃciency. This case might argue for public provision of
neighborhood-level demographic and crime information that can be used to estimate
revenues and costs, or perhaps direct subsidies for ﬁrst movers into neighborhoods
seeking (re-)development.
Thus, whether imitation is consistent with the greater good depends on the in-
formational environment. It is interesting to consider what the model predicts for
well-established suburban areas with thriving concentrations of retail compared with
low-income neighborhoods without much commercial activity at all. Insofar as sub-
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urbs enjoy well-deﬁned land use rules and relatively liquid markets for eﬃciently
channeling development capital to proﬁtable locations, the suburban environment is
informationally easy, in the sense that it is cheap to discover where proﬁts are earned.
The model says that, in an informationally easy environment like that, the imitation
heuristic is both individually eﬀective and socially useful. In contrast, when informa-
tion is expensive or scarce, imitation remains individually eﬀective yet undermines
social eﬃciency.
A general feature of the model is that ﬁrms would always prefer to be second mover
and, if the cost of time is low enough, would choose to wait rather than move ﬁrst,
consistent with the idea of spatial lock-in and systematic neglect of ignored resources
in central cities. Second movers always enjoy greater expected proﬁt because freely
available observation of the ﬁrst mover’s location results in lower total information
costs over the entire parameter space. This suggests a motive for ﬁrst movers to try
to be so large that they exhaust all monopoly rents associated with a particular loca-
tion, perhaps applicable to the phenomenon of big box retail and highly coordinated
development that involves a few very large ﬁrst movers rather than a long sequence
of smaller movers.
Policies aimed at spurring business development in poor neighborhoods typically
rely on the standard economic model of proﬁt-maximization and its assumption that
ﬁrms consider vast, if not inﬁnite, sets of alternatives before choosing where to in-
vest. Empirical work, however, points to strong limitations on ﬁrms’ consideration
sets and their ability to make reliable spatial predictions in terms of proﬁt. Very
diﬀerent policy approaches are called for if ﬁrms’ decision processes diverge from the
standard model and are better represented by a simple decision tree that eliminates
neighborhoods from consideration based on a single reason—for example, because
there are no other ﬁrms there, or because of statistically unsubstantiated fears about
26
high crime, or because of managers’ inherent preferences for areas that are personally
familiar to them. Future work detailing the size and sources of ﬁrms’ consideration
sets when making location decisions, and improved description of the actual decision
process used to choose an element from the consideration set, would be useful.
Milton Friedman’s as-if methodology argues that it is acceptable to use an incor-
rect model of consumers and ﬁrms’ decision processes as long as it predicts behavior
accurately. As-if models may be misguided, though, for purposes of designing policies
to modify behavior. As every student of statistics learns, one can always add param-
eters to achieve arbitrarily good levels of ﬁt with respect to a particular data set. But
ﬁt is not prediction. Prediction requires generalization out-of-sample, often beyond
the current parameter range. Insofar as policy makers working on urban development
wish to achieve outcomes signiﬁcantly outside the status-quo range of behaviors, they
will require empirically grounded behavioral models with suﬃcient psychological re-
alism to achieve accurate descriptions of ﬁrms and consumers’ decision processes.
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Figure 1: Centralized aggregate profit envelope (dash-dotted line), aggregate profit under 
individual choice (solid line), Firm 1's (dotted) and Firm 2's (starred) private information 
acquisition, as a function of inverse information cost (from most to least expensive)
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Figure 2: From decentralized to centralized regimes: Percentage change in aggregate expected 
profit (solid line), Firm 1's information acquisition (dotted), and Firm 2's information 
acquisition (starred), as a function of inverse information cost 
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Figure 3 shows a partition of the universe of possible environments, indexed by the inverse 
relative cost of information and fixed precision of the available signal.  Firms make discrete 
choices of whether to acquire the signal.  Whether firms acquire the signal depends on the 
signal's cost, its (fixed) quality, and--most importantly--whether the firm is first mover or not.  
In the unshaded region, neither firm acquires information because costs of information are 
high relative to the cost savings in deviating from the ideal location a.  In the darkly shaded 
region, both firms acquire information because information costs are relatively low.  In the 
lightly shaded region, however, Firm 1 acquires information but Firm 2 does not.  This 
difference is purely the result of first- and second-mover status, as Firm 2 would have 
acquired the signal had it not been able to freely extract information by observing Firm 1's 
location.
Figure 3: Binary information acquisition decisions as a function of inverse cost of information 
(x-axis) and the fixed precision of the private signal (y-axis): Environments in which neither 
firm acquires private information (unshaded), Firm 1 acquires private information and Firm 2 
does not (lightly shaded), and both firms acquire private information (darkly shaded)
σ2/c 
 _ 
θ 
 _ 
θ 
(σ2/c) 
